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Management Accounting Research and Structuration Theory: A Critical 
Realist Critique 
Introduction and Background 
Giddens'1 structuration theory has long been a popular theoretical lens for management 
accounting researchers, especially in the area of management accounting change.2 Since the 
publication of Robert and Scapens3 and Macintosh and Scapens,4 which introduced structuration 
theory to accounting researchers, many structuration-inspired articles have been published in 
accounting journals. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in evaluating the achievements 
and potentials of the theory in extant accounting research.5 However, we feel that these 
evaluations in accounting research do not seem to fully engage with the fundamentals of 
structuration theory.6 The aim of this paper is to fill this gap.  
Recent works by Englund and Gerdin7 and Englund et al.,8 have carried out a comprehensive 
evaluation of structuration theory inspired accounting studies. Englund et al., have summarised 
the achievements of structuration in accounting studies. Two major contributions are notable. 
First, the structuration theory has made a significant contribution to ‘alternative’ accounting 
research which offers challenges to a rational/positivist view of accounting. Second, it also offers 
an alternative to the more structure or agency centric accounting research and provides us with 
richer explanations of accounting change especially management accounting change. In their 
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evaluations, Englund and his colleagues offer two areas for improvement for accounting 
researchers applying Giddens' structuration theory. The first, as Englund and Gerdin9 
highlighted, is the inconsistencies that are apparent in the conceptualisation of ‘structure’ in 
structuration-inspired accounting literature. The second is the failure of accounting studies to 
appropriate the structuration theory as a whole. Most studies seem to have adopted a research 
strategy of using one or more concepts as a ‘sensitizing device’ for empirical research. Englund 
et al.10 also argued that the structuration theory's potential to contribute to accounting research 
remains untapped perhaps due to the research strategy adopted by structuration-based accounting 
researchers. 
The above critique tends to focus on how accounting researchers interpreted or used 
fundamentals of structuration theory but fell short of critiquing structuration theory itself. We 
wish to extend this debate by identifying the underlying reasons for the apparent weaknesses in 
structuration theory-inspired accounting research. Whilst Giddens should not take responsibility 
for how accounting researchers have interpreted and applied his concepts in explaining 
accounting phenomena, we argue that the roots of these weaknesses perhaps lie in structuration 
theory itself, rather than in its use by accounting researchers. Giddens' structuration theory has 
been subject to severe criticisms by contemporary sociologists,11 but these criticisms are rarely 
echoed in the accounting literature. Thus, this paper aims to draw accounting researchers' 
attention to these criticisms. More specifically, the paper seeks to extend the critique of 
structuration theory from a ‘critical realist’ perspective,12 in particular by demonstrating how 
these theoretical Achilles' heels manifest in management accounting research. We do not wish to 
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discount the empirical and theoretical contributions made by structuration-based accounting 
studies, but merely highlight what accounting researchers may have missed in using this 
theoretical lens.  
In order to underscore what accounting researchers might have neglected by embracing a 
structuration lens, we conduct an intensive examination of one of the most cited structuration-
based accounting studies, namely, Macintosh and Scapens13 (hereafter M&S) and trace the same 
limitations in other more recent structuration based accounting studies. We note that this paper 
mainly focuses on one seminal and a few other recent papers to illustrate the potential 
weaknesses of structuration theory for a deeper understanding of management accounting 
change. Whilst acknowledging the limitationsi of using one or few papers to offer a 
comprehensive critique of theoretical applications, we feel that this is less of a concern for us for 
two reasons. First, we are situating our paper in the context of limitations identified in the recent 
comprehensive review of structuration-based accounting studies14. Second, the critique is of 
fundamental nature primarily associated with the theory itself instead of accounting studies. In 
their paper, M&S15 analysed the empirics of an earlier case study by Covaleski and Dirsmith,16 
using the structuration theory. We have reanalysed the case using a broad critical realist 
framework, as suggested by Sayer17 and Archer,18 and have proposed a way forward. 
This paper has three main sections. First, it briefly describes the various conceptualisations of 
structure and agency commonly used in the sociological literature, drawing attention to Giddens' 
conceptualisation of structure and agency and explaining an alternate critical realist 
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interpretation of structure and agency. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of structuration 
theory and management accounting research through an examination of M&S19, tracing the 
inherent limitations of structuration theory in this seminal paper. This section also relates the 
limitations identified in M&S to other, more recent, structuration-based accounting research 
papers. In the final section, the paper suggests a way forward by re-examining the case study 
used by M&S through a critical realist lens,20 thus setting out new avenues for management 
accounting research. The final section concludes the paper. 
Agency, Structure, and Structuration: A Critical Realist Critique 
Different schools of thought have held various positions regarding the age-old sociological 
debate over structure and agency. This debate has also influenced management accounting 
research.21 Giddens' structuration theory is one of many theories that have contributed to this 
debate. These different conceptualisations of agency and structure, including structuration 
theory, are briefly discussed below. Furthermore, drawing on Porpora's (1989) classification 
scheme, the paper briefly presents a critical realist critique on agency and structure-centric 
studies and structuration. 
Agency-Centric 
According to this school of thought, structure is no more than an abstraction of repetitive 
individual behaviour.22 Generally speaking, interpretive research in accounting falls into this 
category.23 The main criticism with this approach is that any sociological explanation inevitably 
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entails a particular societal context:24 taking an exam assumes an educational system, and 
cashing a cheque assumes a banking system. Individualists' response to this is that the social 
context of individuals comprises nothing but other individuals, along with their motives, 
dispositions, beliefs, and resources. This is an inadequate defence for many, including critical 
realists,25 as individualists tend to deny the existence of properties that emerge when individuals 
form a collectivity. This concept of structure gives primacy to agency and makes structure an 
epiphenomenon—an approach which Archer26 has called ‘upward conflation’. 
This upward conflation is evident in the treatment by interpretive research of the ‘conflict’ which 
inevitably arises in management accounting changes.27 In such research, the actors struggle to 
pursue interests subjectively determined by them in a relatively ‘free floating’ manner. 
Armstrong28 criticised interpretive management accounting change research for its exclusive 
focus on social interaction. The social interactions, he argued, are the structural conditions under 
which the interaction takes place and below is the subjectivity of individuals, which is itself 
shaped by what is above.29  
Structure-Centric 
According to this paradigm, when individuals combine to form collectivities (organisations, 
societies, etc.), these collectivities have more properties than the sum of their parts. Properties of 
collectivities, such as belief systems, the degree of integration, and suicide rates, are assumed to 
be ‘things’ or ‘social facts’ and are the objects of scientific study. Therefore, to investigate these 
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collectivities, the focus should not be on individuals, but on the properties of these collectivities. 
The objective of social science should be to discover regularities (regular connections) between 
the properties of a collectivity such as suicide rates and the degree of social integrity, the idea of 
which is to develop ‘social physics’.  
A good example of this genre of research is contingency-based management accounting 
research, in which different organisational variables, such as firm size, industry affiliation or 
technology, are correlated with management accounting variables such as the flexibility of a 
performance-measurement system or ‘top-down’ budgeting system.30 Based on a cross-sectional 
analysis of firms, researchers confirm or refute a law, for example, large firms are more likely to 
have more formal budgeting systems, whereas firms operating in an uncertain environment are 
likely to have a flexible performance-measurement system; or alternatively, firms pursuing a 
‘differentiation’ strategy focus more closely on the customer satisfaction aspect of the 
performance scorecard, etc. If we are to believe in these laws, we must first believe that large 
firms affect individuals in a law-like way and that these individuals, in turn, design ‘bottom-up’ 
budgets in a law-like manner. Be that as it may, treating structure as a law-like regularity 
between social facts treats agency as an epiphenomenon—which Archer31 has called ‘downward 
conflation’. 
Critical Realist Position on Structure and Agency 
The concept of structure as a system of relationships between positions is most famously 
associated with the Marxist tradition in terms of the relationship between classes in various 
modes of production.32 However, this concept has been extended and refined by critical realists 
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such as Bhaskar,33 Outhwaite,34 and Archer35. In this approach, social structure is a system of 
internally and necessarily related objects (or positions). Two objects are internally and 
necessarily related if the two (or one of the two) cannot exist without the other. Examples of 
internally and necessarily related social objects include father/mother/children, 
capitalist/labour/managers, etc. When two or more social objects combine to form a structure, 
these structures have emergent properties, i.e., the properties of structures cannot be reduced to 
those of individual objects/positions. A typical example from nature is hydrogen and oxygen 
combining to form water, which has emergent properties.36  
In social science, bureaucracy (a structure arising out of internal and necessary relations between 
positions) has the emergent power to work efficiently, an emergent property that cannot be 
reduced to the individuals constituting the structure.37 Similarly, the properties and powers 
belonging to a landlord or tenant cannot be reduced to the individuals in this structure. Those 
individuals who are incumbent in structures have their own powers and properties such as 
reflection, designing projects (including projects to change the structures they inhabit), 
articulation, and organisation for the pursuit of projects. There is, thus, a clear distinction 
between the power of structures (internally related positions) and the power of agents (the 
individuals who occupy these positions). 
Structure influences agents by giving them powers, constraints, and vested interests. Agents 
occupying structural positions, therefore, have a vested interest in either preserving the structural 
condition (usually if they are in a position of relative advantage) or trying to change it (usually if 
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they are in a position of relative disadvantage). Every structural position exercises certain powers 
or constraints over its occupants. These structural constraints and powers are not a figment of the 
incumbents' imaginations, but are real. Critical realists, thus, believe in a reality independent of 
agents' beliefs. Agents' intents and beliefs may be important causes of their actions, and thus 
hermeneutics occupies an important place in critical realist theory. However, agents form these 
beliefs and intents while occupying certain structural positions, and thus the study of social 
phenomena requires the study of each (structure and agency) separately. This analytical 
separation of structure and agency is called analytical dualism and is a hallmark of critical 
realism.38   
Structuration  
The postmodernist turn in social theory resulted in the emergence of various alternatives to 
address the issue of structure and agency. The structuration theory proposed by British 
sociologist, Anthony Giddens, is one of those alternative approaches. Giddens39 suggested that 
individual human agency and social structure are mutually dependent. Social structures do not 
exist independently of human agency: they are both constituted by human agency and, at the 
same time, are the very medium of this constitution, a concept that Giddens calls ‘duality’. 
According to Giddens,40 structure is basically memory traces in the minds of actors in the form 
of rules and resources.41 These rules and resources are instantiated by the agent only when action 
takes place, and thus they structure behaviour. Giddens suggested that every action involves 
human agency as well as the instantiation of structures (i.e., rules and resources in the heads of 
actors), thus forming a ‘duality’.  
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For Giddens, agency and structure operate simultaneously and recursively in the actions of 
agents, depending on how we look at the action. If we look at one side, we see structure; if we 
look at the other side, we see human agency.42 Rules include the agent's perceptions of morality, 
i.e., what is right and wrong (legitimation structure), and semantic rules, i.e. what does ‘this’ 
mean (signification structure), as well as the resources that the agent perceives him or herself to 
possess vis-à-vis other agents (domination structure). Domination structures are also 
characterized by the ‘dialectic of control’. As Giddens explains, “Power relations are always 
two-way, that is to say, however subordinate an actor may be in a social relationship, the very 
fact of involvement in that relationship gives him or her a certain amount of power over the 
other.”43  
Nevertheless, many contemporary sociologists, especially critical realists, have raised significant 
theoretical concerns to ‘duality’ and ‘structuration’. The most significant issue, according to 
critical realists, is not to give due importance to the material conditions which precede and 
condition human action.44  Thompson45 explains, “When a school leaver is faced with the choice 
of joining a youth training scheme or signing on the dole, the constraints which operate are not 
simply those of comprehensibility or sanctioning. For it is the range of alternatives, which is 
restricted, and these restrictions do not stem from semantic and moral rules but from structural 
conditions for the persistence (and decline) of productive institutions”. 
Not treating the material conditions on agents analytically have led to two major concerns with 
respect to Giddens’ conceptualisation of agency as argued by critical realists. First, in the 
absence of separate analyses of material conditions, the power of human agency tends to be over-
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emphasised. Giddens stresses that, at any point in time, the agent “could have done otherwise” 
and “an agent who has no option to [act otherwise] is not an agent”.46 However, factory workers 
and low-level white-collar employees with declining bargaining power in a sluggish economy 
know that their ability to act otherwise is a luxury they can hardly afford. Thompson47 suggests 
that, contrary to Giddens' characterization, some agents happen to be in a position that offers 
more options than others, but even then they may come across constraints external to their 
perceptions of meanings and morality, leaving them with only one option. We need to 
acknowledge that some sympathetic readings of Giddens' provided strong defence against the 
above critique as will be discussed later.48 
The second concern is the motivation of agents in the absence of proper considerations to prior 
material conditions.49 Critical realist accounts of positions and their inter-relationship incorporate 
interests that are bundled together in ‘positions’. These interests furnish agents occupying those 
positions with the motivation to act in a certain manner. For example, a capitalist structure 
provides capitalists with a position of interest and power (and hence motivation) to make more 
profit.  
Furthermore, Giddens' insistence on virtual structures, i.e., rules and resources, has also raised 
further concerns from critical realist perspectives. While it is to some extent understandable that 
some rules may have a virtual status, resources clearly do not belong to the virtual realm. 
Sewell,50 recognising this problem, has suggested an amendment to structuration theory, that is, 
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resources belong to the physical realm and rules belong to the virtual realm. However, assigning 
a physical status to resources means acknowledging that structures are a priori and material, two 
conditions which run contrary to the very spirit of structuration theory.51 
While the virtual or physical status of resources in structuration theory is problematic in its own 
right, Archer (1995) raises questions about the virtual status of rules. Most rules of importance to 
our day-to-day lives are codified (laws, standards, etc.); they are not memory traces in the heads 
of agents, but rather are written in books, manuals, and journals and hence, can be described as 
‘contents of libraries’.52 These rules, like material structures, condition and precede agents' 
actions. They also have an existence independent of their reception and interpretation by agents. 
According to Archer53, knowing, interpreting, or following the rules comes later (in Archer's 
terms, at time T2) and is the domain of human agency.  
Critical realists54 have also raised concerns about the apparent lack of a temporal dimension in 
the relationship between structure and agency. As Giddens considers action and structure to be 
coterminous, he does not “acknowledge that structure and action work on different time intervals 
(however small the gap between them)”.55 The argument is that any value that we could have 
derived from these two concepts being separate in the first place is lost.56 Giddens'57 approach, in 
which the two concepts are linked with each other, is described by Archer58 as ‘central 
conflation’.  
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It is important to note that in the face of strong criticism from critical realist scholars, Stones and 
others59 defended structuration theory, especially against the central criticisms i.e. conflation of 
structure and agency. Stones argued that Giddens duly acknowledged the pre-existence of 
material conditions on agents but a lack of emphasis on those conditions in structuration theory 
perhaps led the critics to misinterpret the theory. In their attempts to clarify aspects of 
structuration theory, both Cohen and Stones, drawing from Giddens' notion of “position-practice 
relations”, extended the structuration theory. Stones' strong structuration theory argued for a 
distinction between external structures (as represented by position-practice relations—and 
containing many of the “real” attributes of structures recognised by critical realists) and internal 
structures (‘virtual’ structures in accordance with Giddens’ definition). In this move, Stones 
incorporated both duality and dualism in his ‘stronger’ model of structuration. According to 
Stones, dualism and duality should not be seen as mutually exclusive notions. Instead they 
should be used as complementary conceptual resources useful for concrete social analysis. 
Without going into the details of ‘stronger’ structuration theory60 or its criticisms, we will say 
that the distinguishing feature of structuration theory is ‘duality’. Incorporating dualism by 
importing external material structures in structuration theory strips structuration theory of its 
very identity61.  
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Having described the debate on structure, agency and structuration, it is useful for the readers to 
see what critical realism, as opposed to structuration theory, might offer in conceptualising and 
understanding management accounting change.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 offers the potential differences between structuration and critical realism when it comes 
to studying accounting changes. The table, in particular, demonstrates key theoretical differences 
in conceptualisation, continuation, and change of accounting practices. These elements will be 
the basis of our discussions about structuration-inspired management accounting studies, in 
particular, M&S.62 This is to highlight what might have been missed by accounting researchers 
by embracing structuration theory. 
Structuration-based Accounting Studies: A Critical Realist Critique 
Over the last twenty-five years, accounting scholars have used structuration theory extensively to 
explain management accounting practices and change.63 These include both 
conceptual/methodological papers64 and empirical papers.65 In order to investigate the theoretical 
problems inherent in structuration theory and its influence on explanations of management 
accounting practice and change, we have selected few recent studies and one of the most 
influential papers in this genre of research - M&S.66 The seminal nature of this paper is evident 
from its extensive quotation, ever since its publication, in accounting papers adopting 
structuration theory. Using structuration theory, M&S67 reframed the empirics of a field study 
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originally published by C&D68. Their objective was to demonstrate the value of structuration 
theory for management accounting research. In order to understand how management accounting 
has been conceptualised in terms of structuration theory, it is important briefly to revisit the 
empirics of the original paper. 
Macintosh and Scapens (1990) 
The original paper by C&D is a longitudinal case study about a budget row between the 
University of Wisconsin and the state governor. The case describes the original budget allocation 
mechanism, its rationale, the change processes therein, and its final shape, covering the actions 
of various actors and social discourses. The University of Wisconsin used to receive its annual 
budget from the state on the basis of an enrolment funding formula (EFF). The state used this 
formula to allocate funds to all state institutions in the areas of instruction, library, and 
educational programs. The EFF was a mechanism that provided the state with an ‘objective’ and 
‘rational’ basis for funding various state institutions. This was especially important given the 
scientific management discourse that had prevailed in the state since the turn of the century. This 
discourse entailed that the state should run its various institutions according to strict scientific 
management principles, leaving aside politics.  
Once the budget was allocated, the state government would leave it to the university 
administration to allocate funds to various campuses and programs. This allowed the university 
to retain administrative autonomy while presenting a rational face to outsiders. This arrangement 
worked to the mutual satisfaction of both parties until budget allocations to all state agencies 
began to decline because of an economic downturn. This scarcity of resources triggered tensions 
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between various campuses within the university. The prestigious Madison campus started to feel 
that it was not being allocated sufficient resources, whereas other campuses started to feel that 
the university's central management was giving too much importance to Madison.  
Under these circumstances, in submitting its 1983–85 budget, the University of Wisconsin 
abandoned the traditional EFF format and instead submitted its budget to the administration 
department in a new format, which involved asking for specific budget amounts against three 
broad categories called ‘decision item narratives’: modernization of laboratory and instructional 
equipment, student demand for professional programs (business, maths, etc.), and better access 
to library resources. These decision narratives were supported by specific examples and 
expressions by the deans regarding their needs, thus giving the process a new form of 
‘rationality’.  
In order to gain external social support, the university promoted the idea that an increased 
resource flow to the university would help the state out of the economic recession. However, the 
university was still trying to retain autonomy in terms of internal allocations by not linking the 
decision narratives (DINs) with specific campuses or programs. The governor, the administration 
department, and the legislative fiscal bureau were unimpressed by this move by the university's 
management. First, the EFF was seen as an age-old, agreed, ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ measure 
for allocating resources to various state agencies. Second, it forced the government to choose 
between different elements such as laboratory, library or equipment. In order to avoid this 
complicated choice between alternatives, the administration department merged the three 
categories into one and recommended to the legislative fiscal bureau more than eighty percent of 
the budget amount sought by the university. 
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It was a win-win situation because the university received significant funding while the 
government did not have to accept the rationality of a different budget format. In addition to the 
budget sought by the university, the governor allocated more funding, one million US dollars, for 
retention of the star faculty, which received considerable media coverage. However, later, when 
the university submitted its faculty remuneration budget to the Joint Commission for Economic 
Resources asking for additional funding for faculty salaries, it was declined by the government. 
The general feeling, according to C&D, was that the governor had beaten the university in the 
budget game, having received publicity for approving a generous budget to the university, which 
in the end, was effectively paid for by the university faculty. The thrust of C&D's paper was to 
demonstrate the social and political side of accounting and so illustrate that accounting is a social 
practice rather than a technical phenomenon. They claimed that it creates reality by making 
certain aspects of organisational life important and others trivial; it gives a rational and objective 
appearance to political and subjective managerial decisions and is itself uniquely implicated in 
changes to societal values.  
The objective of M&S was to illustrate the usefulness of structuration theory; hence, they 
reframed the empirics of the case in terms of structuration theory. According to M&S, the EFF-
based budgeting practice stemmed from a ‘signification structure’ of rationality, neutrality, and 
objectivity and the practice itself reproduced the structure, thus forming a ‘duality’.69 In addition 
to a signification structure, the EFF budgeting system drew on and reproduced a legitimation 
structure as well as power structures, thus reflecting structuration in all three aspects of structure. 
M&S also highlighted other concepts of structuration theory reflected in the empirics of the case. 
For example, the EFF-based budget provided the state with power resources over the university, 
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while at the same time, the university had certain resources in terms of the budgetary information 
it possessed. According to M&S, this budget battle between state and university illustrated 
Giddens' concept of dialectic of control.  
M&S also contended that shortage of funds resulted in the creation of a crisis situation (in 
contrast to the routine situation prevailing before the shortage) in which the agency of the 
university management came to the forefront in an effort to dislodge existing structures of 
meaning, legitimation, and power. The university tried to change the legitimation and meaning 
structures by using the resources available to it, in terms of increased operational information 
about the university and access to the media and civil society. The governor used his 
authoritative resources to merge the three categories into one, thus avoiding treading on 
dangerous ground. The governor and other state departments used existing signification 
structures to question the actions of the university, which the university called irrational. 
However, to appease the university and civil society, the governor used his allocative resources 
to fund, on this occasion alone, more than eighty percent of the budget requested. These actions 
by the state counteracted the challenge mounted by the university questioning the prevalent 
meaning and legitimation structures, which resulted in unintended consequences in terms of the 
governor using his allocative resources to freeze the faculty salary budget at the current level.  
Drawing from this case study and linking management accounting to structuration theory, M&S 
contended that management accounting is involved as a virtual modality (in Giddens' terms) vis-
à-vis all three structures. In terms of meaning structures, it is an interpretive scheme used by 
organisational players to make sense of organisational activities. Management accounting is used 
as a norm to draw on legitimation structures to determine good and bad practices, as well as the 
sanctions and rewards that should be associated with these good and bad practices. Lastly, in 
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power structures, management accounting is used as a resource by organisational actors to hold 
others accountable.  
While very insightful, we would argue that the application of structuration theory seemingly 
under appreciates some significant issues critical to the budgetary process in C&D's case. To 
begin with, there is the issue of the existence of prior material structural conditions in the form of 
the economic downturn in the State of Wisconsin, which limited the choices available to the 
actors on the scene including the choices to act otherwise.70 For example, the state could not 
allocate the amount of funds that it wished to allocate to state agencies, and in a constrained 
funding situation, the university could not spend the amount it desired on various programs and 
campuses. These restrictions did not stem from semantic and moral rules but from a priori 
material structural conditions. Lesser focus on material conditions is clearly evident in M&S 
version of the case perhaps driven by theoretical weaknesses even acknowledged by proponents 
of the structuration theory (Stones, 2001). 
Similarly, looking at the empirics of the case, Macintosh and Scapens'71 equation of management 
accounting with a virtual modality is also a problematic claim (see the earlier discussion of the 
virtual status of ‘rules’). It is unclear from this case study how management accounting can be 
considered virtual. It is apparent from the case that there were detailed, documented accounting 
rules and regulations (e.g., EFF) governing the preparation of state and university budgets; these 
existed in university and state policy and procedure manuals, rather than in the minds of the 
actors involved. The budgeting rules and regulations existed independently and preceded the 
sequence of interactions that took place between the agents in the case study. The agents in the 
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case study tried to change or defend these accounting rules and regulations, which establishes 
that these management accounting rules were independent of and preceded the sequence of 
interactions and had a conditioning influence on the actions of the agents. It is not surprising that 
M&S viewed management accounting as a virtual modality existing only in the minds of the 
actors and manifested only at the time of the action. This was in line with Giddens' own example 
of language as a virtual structure which conditions agency, i.e., ‘speaking the language’, and at 
the same time, is an outcome of the act of speaking the language. Acceptance of the a priori 
existence of ideas and rules outside the minds of actors is a position that does not fit in with the 
basic tenets of structuration theory. Codified rules like accounting have a clear locus of existence 
in books and manuals. However, giving independent ontological status to these ideas would have 
meant bringing in the former idea of ‘dualism’, which is unacceptable to proponents of ‘duality’.  
Structuration-based Accounting Research 
Given that issues identified in the M&S paper above are mainly about basic tenets of 
structuration theory, they are more or less present in other structuration-based accounting 
research including relatively recent papers utilizing the theory. The most important problem, as 
identified above, is the lack of due consideration given to the existence of material structures and 
their causal effect on the actions of incumbents, which is visible in almost all accounting studies 
that use structuration as a theoretical lens.72 Englund et al. and Englund and Gerdin, in which 
they took stock of all accounting papers published till 2014 employing structuration theory, 
argue: some accounting studies, like M&S, conceptualise accounting as a virtual modality; while 
others consider it non-virtual i.e., empirical rules and regulations. Nevertheless, Englund et al. 
attributed the issue of conflation to the misinterpretations/misreadings of Giddens' structuration 
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theory by accounting researchers. We would like to argue perhaps the problem lies with the 
theory itself. We will consider this drawing on some accounting studies below.  
We would argue ‘Agency-related problems’, namely, exaggerated power of agents and their lack 
of motivation, arising from the denial of material structures is evident in structuration-based 
accounting research. For example, on the issue of the ‘power of agents to act otherwise’, the 
main findings of Jayasinghe and Thomas'73 structuration theory-based paper is quite revealing. 
They claimed, “[t]he case study suggests that it is the strongly prevailing patronage based 
political system, as mobilised into the subaltern social structure, which makes individuals unable 
to change and exercise their agencies”.74 Same applies to the second agency-related problem. 
Although the theory does not recognise it, accounting studies which apply structuration theory 
have clearly demonstrated vested interests of agents arising from their ‘positions’. For example, 
in a structuration-inspired study, Lawrenson75 explains how the structure of the British railway 
engineering industry facilitated the dominance of engineers over accountants in controlling the 
industry.  
Similarly, in the context of exploring resistance to accounting change within a division of a large 
multi-divisional firm, Scapens and Roberts76 commented, “[i]t is important not to dismiss 
resistance to accounting change as illogical and emotional. Such resistance is probably informed 
by a whole variety of very real concerns and fears”.77 We would argue that these ‘real concerns’ 
are linked with the real interests of agents occupying certain structural slots within an 
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organisation or society. The same phenomenon of interests associated with structural positions is 
documented in Conrad's78 study of the UK gas industry.  
The problems associated with the ‘virtual’ status of accounting are also evident in structuration-
based papers. For example, in a study of the implementation of a new costing system in a 
hospital, Hassan79 explores how professionals, such as accountants and physicians, draw on their 
stocks of knowledge to influence emergent costing practices. However, in this context, it is 
debatable whether it can be claimed that stocks of knowledge of medicine and accounting exist 
only in the minds of agents: we are all aware that the bulk of this knowledge exists in books and 
journals. Nonetheless, as explained earlier, accepting the a priori and independent existence of 
knowledge means giving an independent ontological status to these ideas. However, this is a 
position that runs contrary to the basic tenets of structuration. 
The second issue identified by Englund et al.80 and Englund and Gerdin81 from the review is the 
selective use of structuration concepts to demonstrate their ‘usefulness’ for accounting research. 
Based on the review of criticism of structuration theory, we contend that problems perhaps stem 
from the theory itself. The approach adopted by Giddens when it comes to engaging his theory 
with empirical situations is that Giddens82 selects other studies to illustrate some of his concepts 
of structuration rather than the other way round, i.e., using theory in a systematic way to explain 
empirical observations.83 For example, Giddens84 used Willis'85 ‘Learning to Labour’, a critical 
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ethnography, to illustrate the concepts of duality of structure. In Willis'86 case study, attitudes to work and 
school create ‘counter school’ actions by the lads and this in turn leads to the reproduction of working 
class ‘culture’. According to Gregson87, none of the studies quoted by Giddens are based on 
structuration theory, meaning that these authors do not adduce structuration theories to explain 
the empirical evidence. Instead, Giddens adduces their empirical evidence to prove certain 
aspects of his theory.88  
In reply to this criticism, Giddens suggests that researchers should use certain aspects of his 
theory selectively as a sensitizing device, rather than using the concepts en bloc.89 Contemporary 
sociologists are somewhat unconvinced about the use of sociological concepts as a sensitizing 
device.90 The problem with this concept of ‘sensitizing’ is that “finding out specifics of a situated 
process and assessing the validity of the attendant account are eschewed in favour of ‘selectively 
looking for’ traces of ontological concepts”.91 The selective use of structuration theory concepts 
is thus an inevitable research strategy, adopted also by accounting researchers. Accounting 
researchers have used it at times to illustrate ‘duality’,92 and at other times, to explain the 
‘dialectics of control’.93 Without discounting the benefits of using concepts as a sensitizing 
device, we agree with Englund and Gerdin's94 and Englund et al.'s95 observation that accounting 
researchers have not sufficiently engaged with the theory as a whole to generate new empirical 
and theoretical insights. However, we suggest, since the theory itself advances the idea of 
                                                 
86
 1977. 
87
 1989. 
88
 Gregson, 1989:242. 
89
 Giddens, 1989:294. 
90
 Stones, 2005. 
91
 Stones, 2005:39. 
92
 Macintosh and Scapens, 1990. 
93
 Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005 
94
 2014. 
95
 2011. 
 23
sensitization using one or two concepts, it is inevitable that accounting studies would have 
followed suit. 
We would like to acknowledge the fact that extensions of structuration theory advanced by 
Stones and Cohen have influenced some recent accounting studies96. Although this paper does 
not have space to discuss extensions of Giddens' work by other sociologists and their influence 
on accounting studiesii, nevertheless, we feel some brief commentaries would be useful for the 
readers. One of the recent management accounting papers, Coad and Glyptis97 used a position–
practice perspective informed by Cohen's work for research in accounting and control. This 
perspective emphasises the link between the praxis of variously situated agents and the 
production and reproduction of social practices. As such, it gives greater prominence to praxis 
and positioning than has hitherto been evident in accounting and control research grounded in 
structuration theory.98 This paper, to some extent, attempted to address the criticisms of 
conflations attributed by critical realists. This is an interesting reading of Giddens by Cohen and 
Stones (as reflected in Coad and Glyptis) for critical realists. As they claim, there is no 
theoretical place for agents' motivation arising from their ‘positions’ in material structures in 
Giddens. If we were to accept the ontological status of ‘position’ or ‘interests’, this would go 
against the core spirit of duality championed by Giddens.  
We find that extensions of structuration by Stones, perhaps to overcome the ontological divide 
between Giddens and Archer and bring the debate on the interplay between structure and agency 
forward (see Stones, 2001) has not had much influence on accounting research. We find only 
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two accounting studies so fariii (since its introduction in accounting research in 2007), drawing 
on strong structuration theory by Stones (Jack & Kholief, 2008; Coad & Herbert, 2009), focused 
on duality (internal structure) while keeping dualism (for external structure) to explain 
management accounting changes. Nevertheless, Coad & Herbert (2009) found it difficult to 
reconcile dualism and duality in their paper. They were critical of Stones’ extensions of 
structuration theory attributing the lack of details regarding the complex interactions between 
external and internal structure that ignores the potential for a plurality of structures, and also the 
potential for agents to “do otherwise”. Offering a comprehensive evaluation of Stones' 
structuration theory is beyond the scope of the paper. Nevertheless, it is suffice to say strong 
structuration theory has also been criticised by contemporary sociologists pointing out the 
problematic notion of duality (Parker, 2006; Elder-Vass, 2010). The following subsection 
provides what ‘dualism’, in particular, critical realism can contribute and offers some new 
insights in relation to management accounting change drawing on the C&D's case study. 
A Critical Realist Framework: New Insights Possible? 
According to the critical realists, empirical events such as the budget row and its eventual 
outcome in C&D's case study, cannot be understood without analysing the underlying structures. 
The job of the social analyst is to identify these structures, their ways of working, and their 
interaction with the agency of the actors involved. Otherwise, as Sayer99 claims: we may commit 
a classical common-sense mistake of ascribing to actors the actions which are actually being 
caused by the underlying structures. Sayer100 gives the example of mortgage officers' practice of 
not giving credit to potential borrowers whose ability to pay is suspect. This practice is supported 
by organisational rules that do not allow mortgage officers to extend credit to a particular type of 
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potential borrower. However, these rules, in turn, operate to cater to the interests of positions 
within a structure, i.e., the capitalists' interest of the maximization of profits. Seen in this light, 
the interests and powers of ‘positions’ within individual entities and organisations are rooted 
within the interests and powers of ‘positions’ within broad institutions that make up the social 
system.101 In modern day western societies, these broad institutions include religion, family, 
state, capitalism, and democracy.102 These positions, and their interests and powers, are created 
through the active efforts of agents.  
So, in the case of University of Wisconsin, the governor's office and other state institutions form 
a structure, i.e., a set of internally related objects. Each object, e.g., the University of Wisconsin, 
comprises certain positions. These ‘positions’, e.g., those of the governor, university 
administrators, etc., endow the incumbents with some powers, vulnerabilities, and interests. The 
initial step in analysing the budget row involves understanding the powers, vulnerabilities and 
interests of those positions, which will push the incumbents of positions (agents) to act in a 
certain manner. For critical realists, these positions preceded their occupants. If we do not accept 
this material structural relationship, then the entire budgeting row may well be reduced to 
interpersonal conflict. However, once created, these positions should have an influence on the 
actions of the agents who occupy these positions. One of these effects of positions is to provide a 
motivation for some position holders to try and change the structures in place and for others to 
maintain the status quo. As explained earlier, organisational rules (e.g., budgeting rules) cater to 
the interests of some positions while they may frustrate the interests of some other position 
holders. The larger structural change in the form of the economic downturn created a situation in 
the University of Wisconsin such that the EFF-based budgeting rules were no longer serving the 
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interests of position holders within the university administration, thus providing them with the 
motivation to change these rules. This is the structural part of the University of Wisconsin budget 
row analysis.  
Next, the agential aspect of the analysis of the case will be discussed. Just because there are 
structural contradictions between the interests of positions creating motivation for certain 
position holders to try to change the organisational rules does not mean that an actual change will 
take place. This also requires a careful reflection on the situation and strategizing of agents. This 
is the moment of agency. According to critical realists, the first step in agential efforts to bring 
about a change involves a declaration of purpose by the agents.103 In the University of Wisconsin 
budget row, we see this in the following passage attributed to the President of the University: 
“Higher education in Wisconsin will require a return to the higher priority of the past. Additional 
state aid… will have to come from a shift in spending priorities by the governor's office and the 
legislature … The traditional formula does not get at the root of the problem.”104 
The declaration of aim facilitates the organisation of agents whose interests are being affected by 
the existing structures and associated rules but are otherwise divided due to a host of reasons.105 
It is apparent from the C&D case study that there were tensions among different campuses of the 
university about the internal allocation of funds across schools and campuses. Madison, a 
prestigious Wisconsin campus, felt that the funds that rightfully belonged to it were redistributed 
among other campuses while other campuses felt that Madison should show more magnanimity. 
Rejection of the EFF-based budget allowed administrators of all campuses to transcend their 
differences and work towards a common cause.  
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For agents to bring about a change, they also need to devise a strategy including a ‘calculation’ 
of the risks involved.106 Agents operate in an environment of uncertainty where the consequences 
of their actions cannot be determined beforehand. This is where the critical realist analysis 
provides a richer explanation of the role of agency as compared to other theoretical accounts, 
which explain social changes in a structural and functional manner or perhaps through the 
enactment of unwritten mental scripts.107 In the University of Wisconsin case, we see these risks 
being taken by actors: “There is a strong undertone that lawmakers do not like to get into 
prioritization of education. The university knows it and likes it that way. They took a risk by 
giving distinct categories. But they were willing to take the risk to get out from under the 
enrolment formula.”108  
 
As explained earlier, according to critical realists, to bring about a change in organisational 
(budgeting) rules, agents occupying disadvantaged structural positions need to carefully craft 
strategies, including the calculation of risks and declaration of the aims for change. Moving 
forward, they need to use, not only the material means available, but also the symbolic resources 
at their disposal. The use of symbolic resources is important for galvanizing support from the 
larger segments of society, especially when the case involves a conflict with the state, which 
controls more material resources than any other institution in a modern society.109 The change in 
budgeting rules, thus required the use of symbolic resources by the university to legitimize the 
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need for change. The university thus rationalized its demand for more money by invoking the 
logic that higher spending on education will lead to economic recovery of the state. 
At the same time, it further justified this logic by universalizing it, i.e., ‘Everyone else is doing 
the same’:  “We would be seriously remiss if we did not make economic recovery and vitality 
major themes of this budget request. No issue is more central to public discussion than this one. 
Clearly much has been done by the university to foster this goal. Yet recent studies also identify 
critical gaps and show areas in which further contributions could be made if additional resources 
were available. Recognising similar opportunities, other states have taken significant steps to 
fund additional university-based training and technology. It seems to us that the time has come 
for comparable initiatives in Wisconsin.”110 
 
It is important to note that a critical realist account of agency is not simply a materialist account 
whereby the agents are pursuing their material interests. The same agents occupy various 
‘positions’ within multiple structures with a possibility that the interests of various positions may 
be at odds with each other. A person occupying the role of a ‘manager’ in a firm may also be a 
‘member’ of a religion, and the ‘interests’ of the two roles may oblige the person to act very 
differently towards his subordinates or fellow brothers in faith. One can understand that two 
structures may cause divergent tendencies within the same agent vis-à-vis the exercise of 
controls within an organisation. This opens up space for human agency, interpreting and 
‘weighing’ structural conditions emanating not just from organisational structures (in the form of 
say pursuit of more ‘profits’) but also from other social structures (Boland, 1993). This power of 
agential interpretation of interpreting structural pressures is duly acknowledged by critical 
realists. According to critical realists, the structures that supersede others, in terms of shaping the 
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behaviour of individuals in a specific situation, are an empirical matter and cannot be determined 
at the level of theory111. In any case, membership of different structures or the wider institutional 
arrangements allow the members to be aware of the different logics that govern these institutions 
and how they can use these to achieve their interests.112 While using the logic that higher 
spending on education will eventually lead to marketplace activity, the agents in C&D113 must be 
aware that there is an opposing market logic which suggests that if ‘markets’ do not support 
programs/campuses in terms of enrolments, these should be shut downiv.  Creating three separate 
DINs was a carefully crafted strategy that not only allowed the university administrators to ask 
for more funds but also created the space for professional autonomy because these DINs could 
not be linked back to individual programs/campuses.  
The ‘interests’ of educational professionals in maintaining professional autonomy generally 
results in the formulation of such strategies by them.114 The counter-action by state officials can 
also be seen through the prism of agency as explained through the critical realists. As compared 
to the university, the state officials (agents) have significantly more material means available to 
them due to their positionv.115 In theory, they could reject or accept any budget form/proposal 
that comes from any institution including the university. However, in a modern society, state 
officials also need legitimacy for the use of their authoritative powers. This required the 
governor and other state officials to engage in ‘budget games’ described in C&D’s116 case study. 
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The critical realist analysis117 can thus explain the University of Wisconsin budget conflict and 
its outcome through analysing the underlying structures that caused the agents to act in a certain 
manner as well as the agency of actors. In a critical realist analysis, while the actors in the case 
used their interpretive frames, actions, and strategies to achieve the desired result, this interaction 
clearly did not take place in a structural vacuum. However, the existence of these prior material 
structures and their influence on the action do not play any role in structuration.118 Accepting the 
existence and effect of prior material structures on agency would have meant accepting the 
‘dualism’ of structure and agency. The lesson that we can draw from a critical realist analysis of 
the University of Wisconsin budget row is that in order to avoid the issue of conflation, it is 
important that researchers should not focus exclusively on ‘actions’. Any organisational 
accounting change research must look at the ‘context’ within which these actions or practices are 
taking place, including the social relations that necessitate the control of one group by the 
other.119 These ‘social relations’ are independent of and precede any accounting practices that are 
the subject of study. More importantly, these material relations have a conditioning effect on the 
nature of the accounting practices we encounter in an organisational setting.  
It is also important to note that there is nothing virtual about accounting practices or accounting 
rules and regulations. Contrary to the approach suggested by structuration theory, where 
accounting has to be seen a virtual modality enacted at the time of action; it is much more fruitful 
to analytically separate the structural conditions from the day-to-day social interaction of 
organisational actors. These structural conditions provide agents with interests to either change 
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the structural conditions and corresponding management accounting practices120 or preserve the 
status quo121. Agents living within the structural matrix, then exercise their agency by trying to 
bring about the changes that suit their material and ideal interests122. At times they are successful 
in bringing about these changes and other times they are not123.  
Concluding Remarks 
We do not wish to argue that the structuration theory has not progressed in accounting research. 
Nor do we wish to argue that the structuration theory has not contributed to accounting, 
especially accounting change. Nevertheless, our focus is to critique fundamentals of structuration 
theory and offer an alternative way forward to incorporate the structural and agential aspects of 
accounting change/stability, especially management accounting change/stability. First, the paper 
extends the recent debate on the contribution of structuration theory advanced by review articles 
published in prominent accounting journals. Whilst recent evaluations have exposed a number of 
significant theoretical issues relevant to management accounting researchers, they have failed to 
reflect on the fundamentals of structuration. In the paper, we sought to demonstrate why 
accounting researchers could not get a better theoretical purchase out of structuration theory to 
illuminate the field of their inquiry as claimed by Englund and Gerdin.124 Second, the paper also 
sought to draw accounting researchers’ attention to criticisms of structuration theory by 
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contemporary sociologists. More specifically, the paper extended the critique of structuration 
theory from a ‘critical realist’ perspective, in particular by demonstrating how these theoretical 
shortcomings manifest in management accounting research. Finally, by conducting an intensive 
examination of one of the most cited structuration-based accounting study, i.e., M&S125, the 
paper sought to highlight what accounting researchers who have embraced a structuration lens 
may have ignored. We argue that a critical realist account of C&D’s126 case study does provide a 
far more in-depth account of budgeting changes and is likely to avoid the problems that are 
encountered by using a structuration theoretical lens.127 We believe that through this analysis, we 
have broadened the current debate surrounding the achievements and limitations of structuration 
theory in accounting research as well as suggesting an alternative way of theorizing the 
accounting phenomena incorporating the role of structure and agency. 
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i
 Other recent examples of similar research include Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al. (2008) and Englund and 
Gerdin (2008), where the authors primarily analysed a single paper to contribute to important theoretical 
conversations in the field of accounting.  
ii
 Issues of conflations have been debated and discussed in accounting studies and management 
accounting change (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Modell, 2014), we wish to remain focused on the 
theoretical debate between structuration and critical realism and its implicaitons for management 
accounting researchers. This has not been discussed in the accounting field.  
iii
 Recently there is a call for special issue by Jack and Kholeif for a special issue of Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability Journal on this particular theme. 
iv
 “[I]n 1982 departing State Governor Lee Dreyfus warned that the UWS would be forced to close some 
of its campuses by economic pressures if it wanted to remain one of the nation's top academic systems. As 
he said, “It is clear that the University of Wisconsin will no longer be able to lead the nation if they decide 
to keep every institution”. (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; p 13” 
v
 According to Weber (1991, p73), “a state is a political organization with a centralized government that 
maintains a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a certain territory”. 
